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REFORMING ACCRETION ANALYSIS UNDER THE
NLRA: SUPPLEMENTING A BORROWED ANALYSIS
WITH MEANINGFUL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Matthew S. Miner*
Current accretion analysis utilizes a variety of factors to determine
whether to merge a non-unionized group of employees with a unionized group of employees within the same firm. The present
construction of the analysis; however, ignores employee views and potential manipulationof the doctrine. By failing to account for these
two important factors, current accretion analysis neglects two key
concerns of the National Labor Relations Act-preventing employer
discriminationand fostering uncoerced employee action and choice.
This Note advocates a better approach, which gives proper weight to
employee views and considers employer motive to control againstthe
possibility of employers manipulatingtheir workforces to avoid labor
obligation&

INTRODUCTION

When a non-unionized group of employees and a similar
group of unionized employees exist within the same firm, the
following question arises: should the representation status of
these two similar groups of employees differ? The answer depends on the analytical path one takes in answering that
question.
One possible analytical path is through accretion analysis as
established by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Accretion analysis is the process by which the NLRB decides
whether to merge a group of non-unionized employees with an
established bargaining unit' of similarly situated unionized
*
Symposium Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
30, 1997. B.A. 1992, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1997, University of Michigan Law
School. Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard W. Vollmer, Jr., United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, 1997-98. I am grateful to Scott Eastmond, Jeffrey Gitchel, and Benjamin Valerio for their helpful comments and
assistance.
1.
A relevant description of the importance of bargaining units under the federal labor laws can be found in 1 SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 448 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992):

515

516

University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform

[VOL. 31:2

employees.' If one utilizes the present accretion analysis to
address the question posed above, the answer one arrives at
will depend on a myriad of factors,3 the sum of which is not
predictable to even the most experienced labor lawyers.'
If instead one considers the same question in light of two of
the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA or Act)5 most basic
policies-preventing employer discrimination' and fostering
uncoerced employee action and choice 7 -the answer may differ
from that reached using accretion analysis. The reason for this
potential difference is that accretion analysis rarely considers

A bargaining unit is a grouping of two or more employees aggregated for the
assertion of organizational rights or for collective bargaining. The bargaining
unit provides the formal arena of the entire collective bargaining process.
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that
"[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
units.. . ." The size and composition of the bargaining unit is often a subject
of dispute between union and employer and between contending unions,
since this decision can determine whether the union is entitled to representative status. A union which may enjoy majority support within a small unit
may not be able to establish its majority in a larger unit.... When the parties to a representation proceeding disagree, the Board determines whether
the unit of employees in which the petitioner seeks an election is an
"appropriate unit...."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
2.
See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759
F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 670 F.2d
754, 756-77 (7th Cir. 1982)).
3.
See id. (noting that numerous factors may enter into an NLRB accretion
determination, including "functional integration of the business, centralized control
of management, similarity of working conditions, collective bargaining history, local
power to hire and fire, degree of employee interchange between the groups, and
geographical distance, similarity of job classifications, skills, functions, and products, and centralization of supervision, particularly in regard to labor relations,
hiring, discipline, and control of day-to-day operations." (citations omitted)).
4.
See Accretion Survey, infra app.
5.
29 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1994).
6.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Southport Petroleum
Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
7.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (stating that the NLRA's declaration of policy is
to be accomplished, in part, by "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing"); see also Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690
F.2d 489, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) ("One of the principal policies of the national labor
laws-that embodied in section 7-is the protection of the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing. . .).
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employee interest,8 and never looks for potential employer
manipulation of the two employee groups being examined.9
Before approving a merger of unionized and non-unionized
employee groups, traditional accretion analysis looks for an
"overwhelming community of interests,"' a nebulous standard
which is measured by the following factors: "geographic
proximity, similarity of skills and functions, similarity of
employment conditions, centralization of administration,
managerial and supervisory control, employee interchange,
functional integration of the employer, and bargaining history.""
The policies of preventing employer discrimination and
protecting employee choice, the central policies of the NLRA, are
conspicuously absent from the above list of factors. This Note
argues that accretion analysis should be reformed to account for
these two important policies by including consideration of
employee views and employer motive in the analysis.
Exactly why employee views are not considered as an accretion factor is unclear. Employee choice is, after all, the
cornerstone of the NLRA, present in the Act's initial declaration of policy 2 and manifested in section 7 of the original Act. 3
Section 714 already plays a role in this context, as the rights of
target employees 5 are one of the legal bases of an accretion

8.
Cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971)
(expressing the concern that accretion deprives the target employees of the ability
to choose a bargaining representative and mentioning that "when the relevant considerations are not free from doubt, it would seem more satisfactory to resolve such
close questions through the election process rather than seeking an addition of the
new employees by a finding of accretion").
9.
See, e.g., Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Serv. Union v.
NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993) (omitting any mention of employer motive from
an extended list of factors that address more fully the problems associated with accretion when it is compared to a traditional bargaining unit determination).
10.
See Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994).
11.
Id. at 454.
12.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
13.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (setting forth rights of employees to self-organize, associate with labor organizations, engage in concerted activity, and choose a bargaining
representative).
14.
Throughout this Note, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the NLRA will be referenced
generally. These references are to specific policies that are advanced generally by each
of these sections (i.e., the right of employees to select their own bargaining representative under section 7, the obligation of employers to refrain from antiunion
discrimination under section 8(a), and bargaining representative exclusivity and unit
appropriateness under section 9).
15.
The term "target employees" is used in this Note to describe the nonunionized employees to be accreted in an accretion case.
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remedy. 6 Given this background, one would think that an expressed desire of the non-unionized group either for or against
unionization would help to justify or ease the decision of
whether to merge the two units. This argument is supported
by the fact that a large number of NLRB and court opinions
have restrictively applied the accretion remedy out of a reluctance to deprive the unrepresented employees of their "basic
right to select their own bargaining representative." 7 If these
target employees were given an opportunity, prior to accretion,
to express their desire for or against unionization, there would
be no need for such reluctance. Employee choice is clearly relevant to the accretion calculus and should be incorporated into
the analysis.
Likewise, the rationale for excluding employer motive from
accretion analysis is also unclear. In other quite similar contexts, the NLRB has considered employer motive, focusing on
employer manipulation of the legal process to avoid labor obligations.' s This Note argues that the possibility of employer
evasive intent should be factored into the present accretion
analysis because under the current approach, an employer's
actions can affect the outcome of an accretion determination.
Part I of this Note describes the accretion doctrine as it currently stands. Part II discusses the need to consider employee
choice and outlines a plan for incorporating it as an accretion
factor. Finally, Part III examines employer motive and the
need to address the possibility of evasive employer intent under the accretion doctrine.

I. ACCRETION DEFINED
Accretion is the merging of a group of non-unionized
employees into an existing bargaining unit of unionized
employees. 9 As explained by one court: "'An accretion' occurs
when new employees are added to an already existing
16. See Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969); Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 495 F. Supp. 619, 633-34 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
17.
Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992); see also Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971) ("As a general rule, the accretion
doctrine should be applied restrictively since it deprives the new employees of the
opportunity to express their desires regarding membership in the existing unit.").
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113-31 (discussing the alter ego doctrine).
19.
See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759
F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir. 1985).
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[bargaining] unit."2" The additional employees are absorbed
into the existing unit without first having an election if the
"additional employees share a sufficient community of
interest with the unit employees and have no separate
identity. The additional employees are then properly21
governed by the unit's choice of bargaining representative."
This merger into one bargaining unit ensures that the terms
of one common collective bargaining agreement cover both
groups of employees, and also ties the groups together for the
purpose of future union representation elections.2" To justify
an accretion order under the present NLRB analysis, the two
groups of employees must share an "overwhelming
community of interests" 23 and the non-unionized group must
not possess a separate identity from the unionized group.2 4
The NLRB measures the need for accretion with a set of
factors borrowed from
the context of traditional bargaining
unit determinations. 25 While the factors are the same, the
community of interests finding required under accretion
analysis is more difficult to satisfy than that required in a
traditional bargaining unit determination. 26 For example,
20.
Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 1981)
(quoting NLRB v. Sunset House, 415 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1969) (alteration in original)). An alternate statement of the accretion doctrine requires that the target group
of employees be smaller in number than the existing collective bargaining unit:
Pursuant to the accretion doctrine, an employer may incorporate a small group
of employees to an already existing collective bargaining unit, without holding
elections, so long as the added employees (1) do not constitute a separate bargaining unit and (2) do not outnumber the employees who belong to the existing
bargainingunit.
Local 144 v. NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
21.
Universal Sec. Instruments, 649 F.2d at 253 (quoting Lammert Indus. v.
NLRB, 578 F.2d 1223, 1225 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978)).
22.
See SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 1, at 404 ("If the
additional facility is found to be an accretion to the existing operation, the preexisting
contract may be extended to cover employees in the new operation and thus bar an
election there.").
23.
Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994).
24.
See id.; see also Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Serv. Union
v. NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that "where the two groups of employees can be classified appropriately into separate, viable bargaining units, accretion is
not permissible").
25.
See Staten Island, 24 F.3d at 454 (stating that both accretion and unit determination findings rely on the same shared interest determination); see also NLRB v. Stevens
Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the accretion criteria "include the
usual factors relating to unit determinations involving two groups of employees").
26.
See Staten Island, 24 F.3d at 455 ("The primary difference between accretion
and unit determination analyses is one of degree rather than kind. Accretion requires
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under traditional bargaining unit determinations, courts and
the Board look for a "community of interests" between the
employees involved, 7 while in the accretion context, the
required finding is an "overwhelming community of
interests."28 The difference is due to the Board's restrictive
application of accretion which is based on its reluctance "to
deprive employees of their basic right to select their own
bargaining representative." 9 Such a concern is not present in
traditional bargaining unit determinations because those
determinations typically precede representation elections.
The borrowed factors used in accretion analysis generally
include: "geographic proximity, similarity of skills and functions, similarity of employment conditions, centralization of
administration, managerial and supervisory control, employee
interchange, functional integration of the employer, and bargaining history.""0 Other factors may be considered, 3 and some
of the traditional factors listed above occasionally receive additional weight. 2 When the factors listed above militate both for
and against accretion, a balancing of factors is necessary. 33
Situations requiring accretion analysis can arise in a number of different circumstances, such as when an employer
opens a new business while owning existing businesses,3'
purchases new plants or facilities, 35 creates spin-off facilities,36 or restructures its business in an attempt to avoid
unionization.37 Accretion can also be applied when a court

an overwhelming community of interests between a smaller group of employees and a
larger unit, because accretion casts the smaller group, against its will, into the larger
unit.").
27.
See SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 1, at 451.
28.
See Staten Island, 24 F.3d at 455; see also supra text accompanying note 23.
29.
Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992).
See Staten Island, 24 F.3d at 454; see also Local 144 v. NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223
30.
(2d Cir. 1993) (listing the same eight factors).
31.
See Local 144, 9 F.3d at 223.
32.
See, e.g., Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. at 1174 (giving additional weight to
interchange of employees, and the amount of common day-to-day control and management); Towne Ford Sales, 270 N.L.R.B. 311, 311-12 (1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 1477,
1478 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that these same two factors are "especially important").
See Pan Am. Grain Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 442, 447 (1995).
33.
34.
See Safety Carrier, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 960, 969 (1992).
35.
See Central Soya Co. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1988).
36.
See Save Mart of Modesto, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1190-91 (1989).
37.
See THOMAS A. KOCHRAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 60 (1994) (describing the UAW's tactics, including accretion,
which were used to stop General Motors' use of southern facilities to avoid unionized
workers).
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finds the union and nonunion components of a doublebreasted employer' to be a single employer. 9
The source of the accretion doctrine can be found both in
case law and in the NLRA. Therefore, some statutory background- is desirable. The NLRB derives most of its accretion
authority from section 9 of the NLRA.4 ° Subsection (a) of that
section provides for exclusive representation by the union
elected or recognized by the majority of employees within a
unit.4' Subsection (b) gives the Board the direct authority to
decide which unit is appropriate "to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter.4 2 To effectuate these provisions, subsection (c) of
section 9 enables an employee, union, or employer to petition
the Board to determine the need for an election, or in the case
of accretion, the appropriateness of a bargaining unit. 3
Additional accretion authority is derived from section 7 of
the NLRA. As mentioned above, section 9(b) allows the Board,
in making its determination of unit appropriateness, to consider the goal of assuring employee "freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this subchapter." The employee rights
referenced are those found in section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7
is the backbone of the NLRA, granting employees several
rights, including the rights "to self organization" and "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."" Unfortunately, the governing case law does not

38.
An employer is referred to as double-breasted when it operates two very
similar companies or branches, one of which is staffed by unionized workers and the
other by non-union workers. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the DoubleBreasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a
Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 67, 68 ("Double-breasting typically occurs
when a unionized employer, experiencing .competitive difficulties, creates an ostensibly separate firm with a nonunion workforce."). See generally id. (discussing the two
key legal approaches to the problem of double-breasted enterprises).
39.
See, e.g., Mohenis Serv., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 326 (1992).
40.
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994); see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 495 F. Supp. 619, 633-34 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (holding that section 9 of the
NLRA allows the NLRB to determine the appropriateness of a bargaining unit); Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 108 (1969) (holding that section 9 of the NLRA
mandates finding the appropriate unit to protect employee rights).
41.
See 29 US.C. § 159(a) (providing the right of exclusive representation to the
bargaining representative chosen or selected by a majority of unit employees).
42.
Id. § 159(b).
43.
See 29 US.C. § 159(c) (giving the NLRB authority to hear bargaining unit determinations); see also Pilot FreightCarriers,495 F. Supp. at 633.
44.
29 US.C. § 159(b).
45.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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clarify section 7's precise link to present accretion analysis.46
Even if not clarified in NLRB and court opinions, it is quite
clear that the accretion doctrine attempts to further section 7
by protecting the unit integrity of organized workers, thereby
enabling that group to bargain with its employer on a more
balanced table. 7 For example, if a group of non-unionized employees were allowed to exist in an organization alongside a
similar group of unionized employees, the bargaining power of
the unionized employees would be weakened, and their section
7 rights would, thereby, be impaired.
While section 9 of the NLRA provides the primary authority
for the present accretion doctrine, it is section 7 of the Act that
dominates with respect to the underlying policy behind the
accretion doctrine. 8 Alternatively stated, the employee rights
found in section 7 provide a policy basis for accretion analysis,
while section 9 is the enforcement arm through which the accretion doctrine functions. This function of section 949 is,
however, subordinate to section 7 rights of organization. 0
Therefore, in any application of section 9 and its concerns for
bargaining exclusivity or unit appropriateness, the interests of
the employees involved should be the primary concern.
Before proceeding into the reforms proposed in this Note, it
is important to mention that the present accretion framework
has other limitations beyond its failure to consider employee
views and employer motive. For one, the present framework
lacks clarity51 and is inconsistently applied.52 Such faults may
be explained by the fact that certain factors like collective
46.
Cf Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969) (mentioning how section
9(b) is designed to serve section 7 while never mentioning exactly how section 9(b)
would best perform this function).
47.
Accretion furthers unit integrity by keeping groups of employees together for
bargaining purposes where those groups are separated by only insignificant functional differences. See Central Soya Co. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the NLRB, in a lower decision, found it significant that "the two groups of
employees were fairly well integrated with few functional differences").
48.
See Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 796-97 (5th Cir.
1973); see also Melbet, 180 N.L.R.B. at 109.
49.
The function of section 9 referred to in the text includes both protecting the
exclusivity of the bargaining representative chosen by the organized employees under
section 9(a), and selecting an appropriate bargaining unit to protect both organized
and unorganized employees' rights under section 9(b) of the NLRA.
50.
Melbet, 180 N.L.R.B. at 109.
51.
See Accretion Survey, infra app. (showing that only 55% of the small sample
of labor attorneys polled felt that the present accretion factors were clear or provided
adequate guidance).
52.
See id. (showing that 73% of the sample of union side labor attorneys felt
that the present accretion analysis was inconsistent).
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bargaining history add nothing to the process,5 3 while other
factors, such as similarity of employment conditions, can vary
greatly between units while the actual jobs performed and the
need for accretion remain the same.' These other limitations
are beyond the scope of this Note. Some clarity, however, can
be added to the accretion process by incorporating the
consideration of employee views and employer evasive intent.
Addition of these concerns would give independent policy and
purpose to accretion analysis beyond the current borrowed
polices of traditional bargaining unit determinations.
II. CONSIDERING WORKERS' VIEWS
A. The Relevance of Employee Views
Employee section 7 rights are the foundation of the NLRA.
Without this protection of employee choice and collective action, the NLRA would likely be totally ineffective. 55 The Act
would also fall short on one of its policy goals which is to
53. Where one group is unionized and the other group is not, a study of collective
bargaining history does nothing but restate the problem that is being examined-one
group is under a bargaining agreement, while the other is not.
Some opinions have taken a waiver approach where the organized unit has entered
into previous bargaining agreements without first trying to accrete the employees
now targeted for accretion. Such an approach ignores the fact that two sets of employees are involved. An act of the organized group of employees should not be allowed to
bind the rights of the unorganized employees involved. Likewise, employers should
not be able to erase the basic right to unit integrity conveyed under section 9(b)
through hard bargaining and tactical pressure applied at periods surrounding contract expiration. Insofar as employees should not be able to contract away their
section 7 rights in accepting a company union under sections 8(a)(2) and (3), they
should not be allowed to bargain away their right to a complete and appropriate unit
under section 9(b). This right protects the process of collective bargaining as much as
it protects the individual interests of employees.
54. Variance in employment conditions can occur without any change in the jobs
performed by the two groups of employees and even if there is a common identity of
those two groups. If anything, such variance merely indicates that one group is receiving different treatment from the other group in terms of pay, benefits, or work
environment. This is precisely the point of accretion and the maintenance of unit integrity: if two groups of employees are functionally the same, they should be treated
the same and included under the same bargaining agreement. Failure to do so affects
the bargaining rights of the organized unit by allowing a group of employees functionally identical to union members to exist in the organization under terms unilaterally
set by the employer. This weakens the bargaining strength of the organized employees
and violates the exclusivity rights of their bargaining agent.
55. In fact, without section 7, the NLRA would be little more than a rulebook for
union-management relations with no protection afforded the individuals within a
bargaining unit.
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"protect [ the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing.""s Given that protecting employee views is a
primary policy goal of labor relations law, one must question
why those same views are not counted in the accretion context.
In examining this issue, it is important to note that the target employees in an accretion situation were not present to
vote when the accreting bargaining representative was chosen.
These employees were, after all, not in the bargaining unit
when the issue of representation was decided. Therefore, if the
target employees are accreted without any consideration being
given to their views, they will be assigned a representative not
of their57 own choosing, a result contrary to the policy of the
NLRA.
This anomalous result under the NLRA is enough to merit
some consideration of employee choice in the accretion context.
Although the weight that such a consideration should receive
is debatable, there is certainly room for considering employee
views among the numerous accretion factors. There is also
considerable demand for including employee choice in the
accretion analysis, as a survey of experienced labor law
attorneys suggests. Forty-one percent of those attorneys
indicated that it was odd that workers' views are not factored
into an accretion determination. 8 Forty-five percent of
management-side respondents expressed the same view.59 This
support on both sides of the labor-management divide leaves
little reason not to give some consideration to the views of
target employees in an accretion situation.
There also seems to be a good measure of support within the
NLRB and the judiciary for including consideration of employee views. This support can be found in the different
treatment afforded accretion analysis as compared with traditional unit determination analysis.60 For example, in Staten
Island University Hospital v. NLRB, the Second Circuit noted
that "[tihe primary difference between accretion and unit determination analyses is one of degree rather than kind.
56.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added) (listing the Act's "[flindings and declaration
of policy").
57. See id.
58. See Accretion Survey, infra app.
59. See id.
60. Accretion analysis requires an overwhelming community of interests between the two groups of employees involved; unit determination analysis requires
only a substantial community of interests among the group of employees being considered. See Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Accretion requires an overwhelming community of interests
between a smaller group of employees and a larger unit, because accretion casts the smaller group, against its will, into
the larger unit.""1
While the language of the Staten Island court is perhaps a
bit too dramatic,' both courts and the NLRB seem uneasy accreting target employees whose representation preference is
unknown.6 Key accretion opinions state that accretion must
be restrictively applied due to the intrusion on the target employees' section 7 rights.' In Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc.' the
Board went so far as subordinating section 9(b) of the NLRA
(governing bargaining unit propriety), to employee section 7
rights.66 The Board cited a mandate under the NLRA "that
employees' rights are to be protected and that appropriate unit
findings under Section 9(b) must be designed to preserve those
rights."67 These examples of judicial caution show that courts
and the Board are already considering the target employees'
choice in their decisions. It is, however, rare that the actual
views of target employees are considered in the analysis. 8
Although employee views are not openly considered in the
great majority of accretion cases, some opinions have expanded
their analysis to include an "employee views" factor.69 Two Second Circuit opinions contain the strongest language
supporting the consideration of employee choice in the accretion context. In NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc.,7° the court
indicated that the eight factor analysis used so frequently in
61.
Id.
62.
Without measuring the views of the target group, it is impossible to say that
an accretion would be "against its will." The relevant concern would be that the target
employees, if accreted, had no say in choosing their own bargaining representative.
63.
See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971) ("As
a general rule, the accretion doctrine should be applied restrictively since it deprives
the new employees of the opportunity to express their desires regarding membership
in the existing unit."); Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992) ("Mhe
Board has followed a restrictive policy in finding accretion because it is reluctant to
deprive employees of their basic right to select their own bargaining representative.").
64.
See Gitano Group, 308 N.L.R.B. at 1174.
65.
180 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1969).
66.
See id. at 109 (stating that "[s]ection 9(b) directs the Board to select units to
'assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising rights guaranteed by this Act
...- which rights, of course, are those set out in Section 7").
67.
Id.
68.
See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
69.
See, e.g., Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Union v.
NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468,
473-74 (2d Cir. 1985); Mohenis Servs., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 326, 332 (1992); Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969).
70.
773 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1985).

526

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 31:2

accretion determinations (i.e., geographic proximity, interchange of employees, etc.)71 stems from unit determination
cases. The court then stated that "[blecause accretion occurs
without an election, however, factors not generally considered
in unit determinations must also be taken into account."7 3
Among these factors the court listed the "views of the group to
be accreted."74 The Stevens Ford court explained that "evidence
of the views of the employees subject to accretion is relevant.
Such evidence is usually available where two unions are engaged in competing organizing efforts, but may exist in other
cases as well."75
In the other relevant Second Circuit case, Local 144 v.
NLRB,7 6 the court followed the Stevens Ford logic: "Factors to
consider in determining whether employees should be accreted
into an existing bargaining unit without an election include... (5) views of the employees to be accreted." 77 The court
later applied the employee views factor, looking to the Board's
decision below for guidance regarding how the factor fit into
the analysis. 7' The court found it persuasive that the Board
had considered "the views of the [non-unionized] employees
who initiated this complaint.""
Additional Board authority exists to support considering the
views of target employees in the accretion context. In Mohenis
Services, Inc.,sO the Board clearly advocated considering employee views: "In deciding whether a new group of employees
is an accretion.., the Board not only considers such factors as
functional integration, level of management control, similarity
of working conditions,... but also gives special weight to the
interests of the unrepresented employees in exercising their
own right to self-organization."8 '
While some modest Board authority can be found to disagree with the consideration of employee views in accretion

71.
72.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See Stevens Ford, 773 F.2d at 473.

73.

Id.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 474.
Id. (citations omitted).
9 F.3d 218 (2d Cir.1993).
Id. at 223.
See id. at 224.

79.

Id. (citing Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 1992 WL 442366, at *40 (NLRB Dec. 16,

1992)).
80.
308 N.L.R.B. 326 (1992).
81.
Id. at 332 (quoting NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc. 399 F.2d 501, 502
(9th Cir. 1968)).
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cases,82 more case law and policy under the NLRA militate in
favor of some consideration of target employee views.83
Despite the doctrinal differences that exist in the case law,
the reality is that the Board and courts consider employee
views every time they enter into an accretion determination.8
However, the problem with the present consideration of employee views is that the Board and courts only express a
generic, passive concern for employee choice and interest and
rarely, if ever, look to what the actual employees involved
think or feel about the prospect of accretion or representation.85 The consideration of employee interests generally stops
with the standard doctrinal line that "the accretion doctrine
should be applied restrictively since it deprives the new employees of the opportunity to express their desires regarding
membership in the existing unit."8 This nominal consideration
should be extended to a genuine consideration of actual employee views and interest. Because present legal analysis
already gives this nominal consideration to employee interests,
and because some legal authority exists to support further
consideration,87 it naturally follows that employee views
should be added to accretion analysis as a regular factor.

82.
See Honeywell, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 278, 283 (1992) ("If a proper accretion exists, then the effected employees have no right to select or decline their own
bargaining representative.... ."). This case only provides modest support for not considering employee views in the accretion context because the decision does not discuss
the unanimous rejection of unionization among the targeted employees with respect
to the outcome of the case. Id. The decision ultimately denied accretion and the role
that employee views actually played in that decision is, at best, ambiguous. See id. at
285-86.
83.
See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
84.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
85.
See, e.g., Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992) (mentioning the
Board's restrictive policy in finding accretion due to a reluctance "to deprive employees of
their basic right to select their own bargaining representative"); see also Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971) (favoring election over accretion in close
cases out of a concern for depriving the target employees of the "opportunity to express
their desires regarding membership in the existing unit"). But see Mohenis Servs., Inc.,
308 N.L.R.B. 326, 332 (1992) (echoing the language of Westinghouse but also mentioning
that accretion might be able to go forward if the employees provided evidence indicating
that they wanted the union to represent them).
86.
Westinghouse, 440 F.2d at 11.
87.
See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
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B. IncorporatingEmployee Views into Accretion Analysis
The NLRA places a great deal of emphasis on employee
choice of bargaining representatives." It is, therefore, important that any new consideration of employee views not
displace the protections already afforded employee choice. To
achieve such a result, this Note proposes incorporating employee views at two levels of the accretion analysis. The first
level adds an employee views element to the regular set of accretion factors. The second level maintains the current
occasional use of representation elections to resolve close cases
where the factors do not clearly and overwhelmingly support
accretion."9
Applying employee views as a regular accretion factor
should not be a difficult undertaking. The factors that have
traditionally been applied are numerous and sometimes vary
from case to case.' Adding employee views to the mix would
not upset the balance represented by the current list of factors
because choice already influences the community of interests
finding through clearly expressed policies of judicial
restraint."' Additionally, under the present analysis, no single
factor is required to justify an accretion remedy, and not all of
the factors must point toward a shared community of interests
in order to allow for an accretion finding.' Accordingly, if
employee views were added to the present analysis of factors,
there would not necessarily have to be a definitive finding as
to employee choice in order to grant accretion, and the factor
analysis would not be diluted in a situation where the
employee views factor was ambiguous.93
88.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1994); see also Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v.
Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that one of the principal policies of the NLRA is the "protection of the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing").
89.
See Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1036, 1041-42 n.16
(9th Cir. 1978).
90.
See NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1985) (adding

five additional factors to the traditional set of unit determination factors).
91. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
92.
See, e.g., Pan Am. Grain Co., Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 442, 447 (1995) (providing for
a balancing of factors where factors militate both for and against accretion).
93.
Considering employee views, however, could affect the possibility of settlement. If it seems probable that employees would favor unionization, the parties could
well settle their dispute for a stipulated election. After the election, if the result was
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If employee views were added as a factor, the amount of
weight to give that factor is unclear. As already mentioned,
courts occasionally place a greater amount of emphasis on two
of the traditionally considered accretion factors: interchange of
employees and common management and supervision.' Courts
could give similar weight to employee views in light of the special protections afforded employee choice under the NLRA,95
and considering that the present judicial reluctance to apply
accretion has been linked with a general uncertainty as to the
target employees' views.96 If evidence of employee views could
routinely be introduced into the analysis, the need for such judicial reluctance would be alleviated. Accordingly, there
appears to be sufficient reason to afford an employee views
factor more weight in the accretion analysis.
There is, however, a problem with giving additional weight
to the views of the employees to be accreted. For example,
what should happen in a situation where the target employees
oppose an accretion, but all other factors indicate an overwhelming community of interests between the two groups?
Which prevails, the section 7 rights of the target employees, or
the section 9 rights of the organized unit's representative? If
one only considered the language of the Board in Melbet Jewelry, declaring that section 9(b) is subservient to the purposes
positive, the two groups could then be merged under a lesser community of interests
showing as is allowed under less strict traditional unit determinations. Such a result
would reduce both sides' legal expenses by avoiding the more knotty accretion issue.
The inclusion of employee views would in some degree foster this kind of settlement because after either a positive employee views showing or an election, the
process would revert to a less burdensome community of interests showing. A lesser
community of interests showing would be required where employee views were found
to favor accretion under the proposed reform. This is because a finding that employee
views favored accretion would be given more weight in the analysis. See infra notes
94-102 and accompanying text. The lesser community of interests showing would also
be sufficient after a positive election result because such a demonstration of employee
choice alleviates the need for the more restrictive shared interests test. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1985).
Some support for this prediction of increased settlement may be found in the fact
that elections are already being proposed in settlement discussions. See Accretion
Survey, infra app. (mentioning that 55% of the small sample of labor attorneys polled
had been involved in cases that either settled for an election or where election was
proposed in settlement discussions).
94.
See Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992); Towne Ford Sales,
270 N.L.R.B. 311, 311-12 (1984), aftfd, 759 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1985).
95.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. PrattFarnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 512 (5th Cir. 1982).
96.
See Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994); Mohenis Servs., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 326, 332 (1992); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB,
440 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971).
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of section 7,97 one might be inclined to give the additional
weight to employee views against accretion. The analysis however, must go farther in order to strike the balance intended by
the Act. At least two other concerns must be considered.98
First, the section 7 rights of the target employees are not
the only rights involved. The unit employees also have rights
and interests at stake. Their interests are the flipside of the
Board's language in Melbet Jewelry. Section 9(b) of the NLRA
is intended to "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act."99 This purpose is
accomplished by preventing a parallel group of employees from
existing within the same organization, but outside of the bargaining unit and collective bargaining agreement, thereby
weakening the unit's scope and bargaining position. By protecting the integrity of the organized employees' bargaining
unit and chosen representative, section 9(b) also protects the
unit employees' expression of a preference for unionization. It
would, therefore, be careless to place the section 7 rights of the
target employees above the purpose and intent of section 9(b)
without first considering the rights and interests of the bargaining unit employees.
Another consideration relevant to the weight attributable to
target employee views is the present distinction between the
community of interests showing required under accretion
analysis and that used in traditional bargaining unit determinations. 0 By requiring a more rigorous community of interest
showing under accretion analysis, courts already account for
the risk that the target employees may be accreted against
their will.'O Accordingly, no additional weight should be given
to target employee views when they oppose accretion because
the present accretion framework limits itself in anticipation of

97.
Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1969).
98.
Another concern that may be appropriate regarding the appropriate weight
to give target employee views against accretion is the size of the unit to be accreted. If
the size of the target group is small relative to the organized group, the views of those
employees are arguably less important relative to the interests of the bargaining unit
employees. Where, as here, the interests of those two groups are adverse, the relative
size of the target employee group may reduce the weight afforded its views.
99.
Melbet Jewelry, 180 N.L.R.B. at 109 (citation omitted).
100. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
101. See Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The

primary difference between accretion and unit determination analyses is one of degree rather than kind. Accretion requires an overwhelming community of interests
between a smaller group of employees and a larger unit, because accretion casts the

smaller group, against its will, into the larger unit.").
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such opposition.' ° By contrast, when a group of target employees favors accretion, the rationale for restrictively applying the
accretion remedy no longer seems appropriate. Such is the
case because the situation approximates that of a traditional
bargaining unit determination where there is no fear that employees are being placed in a bargaining unit against their will
and without having voiced a preference.
One other issue that might arise in this discussion of adding
employee views to the factored accretion analysis is the question of calculation and evaluation of these views. How is
evidence of employee views to be assessed without first having
an election? In NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., °Othe Second Circuit provided a partial answer to this question, stating that
"evidence of the views of the employees subject to accretion is
relevant. Such evidence is usually available where two unions
are engaged in competing organizing efforts, but may exist in
other cases as well.""° Other areas where such evidence may
be found include union card showings, union petitions, and independent petitions from employees. 5
One further caveat must be added to this discussion: Allowing employee views to factor into accretion analysis should
not alter the present occasional use of representation elections
in those close cases where the community of interests finding
falls just short of commanding accretion. Omitting this use of
elections would create a gap in the present protection afforded
by NLRA sections 7 and 9.106 As was already mentioned, the
102. See id.
103. 773 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
105. While this last indication of employee views may seem unlikely, the target
employees in one recorded case did submit their own independent petition against
representation and accretion to the Administrative Law Judge hearing their case. See
Honeywell, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 278, 282-83 (1992).
106. As mentioned above, there is a tension under accretion doctrine between the
protected rights of choice among the employees to be accreted and the bargaining
exclusivity and unit appropriateness protections afforded organized employees. See
Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1973); Melbet
Jewelry Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1969). This tension results in the more constrained and narrow application of accretion relative to traditional unit
appropriateness determinations. See Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450,
455 (2d Cir. 1994). Where the narrower doctrine of accretion is not satisfied and, thus,
cannot be applied out of a concern for placing the group of target employees "against
its will" into an organized unit, see id., the Board will order an election. The election
satisfies the section 7 concerns relating to the target employee choice, and it allows for
a traditional unit determination to protect section 9(b) interests. See infra notes 108-10
and accompanying text. If this option is removed, the B, ard would lose its most effective
mechanism for protecting the different parties' interests under sections 7 and 9.
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determination of the appropriateness of a particular bargaining unit is judged by a community of interests standard based
on factors similar to those used in accretion analysis. In order
to justify accretion, however, courts and the Board apply the
tougher overwhelming community of interests standard. The
reason for the difference in the strictness of these two standards is that employees in an accretion situation are not
allowed to express their views as to representation, whereas
an election generally follows a bargaining unit determination.1" Because the facts of a particular case may fall short of
justifying accretion while at the same time indicating that a
single unit would be appropriate, the NLRB sometimes denies
a standard accretion but orders or recommends an election to
resolve the issue of merging the two groups into one unit."'8
Such a decision can result when the court finds the combined
unit to be an appropriate unit but still not the most appropriate unit as is required for a standard accretion order."
This election option should be maintained even after the
proposed addition of an employee views factor to the standard
accretion analysis. Situations may still arise where there is no
evidence as to employee views or where the evidence as to employee views is contradictory. In such cases where the
accretion determination remains close, the election option
should remain to fill gaps in the analysis and perhaps permit
accretion where it is needed but not mandated by the initial
legal analysis. Such a result can work to ensure the narrower
application of accretion where employee views are not clear,
while still allowing the NLRB to protect the interests of bargaining unit exclusivity and unit appropriateness under
sections 9(a) and (b) where the community of interests finding
falls just short of justifying accretion.

107. See Staten Island, 24 F.3d at 455.
108. See, e.g., Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1036, 1041-42
n.16 (9th Cir. 1978) (describing the NLRB's use of an election order to resolve a close
accretion case).
109. See Pacific Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d at 1041-42 n.16 ("It follows that accretion may be initially rejected as a legitimate alternative, though the employees are
subsequently added to the existing unit once they have elected to do so.").
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III. CONSIDERING EMPLOYER MOTIVE

In addition to adding employee views to the accretion analysis, this Note also examines the possibility of adding employer
motive as an accretion factor. This Part will look at reasons for
considering employer motive and will discuss how this factor
should be considered in the accretion analysis.
A. Why Worry About Employer Motive?
One does not have to look far to find examples of large
American employers that have established new plants and facilities with the goal of reducing their reliance on unionized
employees. While this goal alone may sufficiently demonstrate
an illegal union animus, the intended effect could be aimed at
a more insidious outcome. Such employer action may be geared
toward the eventual deunionization of the employer's complete
workforce. This process is described by John Lawler as follows:
[One] means of deunionization through the elimination of
union jobs is related to plant relocation but is effected
through a longer-term process of simultaneously expanding nonunion facilities while allowing unionized facilities
to decline.... The flip side of developing nonunion
"greenfield" sites is likely to be disinvestment, either
rapid or gradual, in unionized facilities, as work shifts to
the nonunion plants. In the long term this results in a
lessened dependence of the firm on organized workers
and sets the stage for phasing out increasingly inefficient
unionized facilities.'10
Given the potentially extreme consequences of this kind of
employer restructuring, the accretion doctrine should be
reformed to limit employers' ability to weaken organized unit
integrity through the establishment of nonunion sites. Even if
an employer's goals are more modest ones of limiting union
bargaining power or reducing reliance on union facilities, the
problem only changes in its scope. An employer can create new
110. JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION: STRATEGY, TACTICS,
AND OuTcoMEs 177 (1990).
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job classifications or new plants and facilities with the intent
of removing work and employees from an established
bargaining unit."' While such action by an employer may
violate its duties under section 8(a) of the NLRA, the
employer's action also can affect the accretion analysis by
influencing the various factors. In light of such a possible
effect, a consideration of employer motive needs to be
incorporated into the present accretion framework.
When an employer alters its production facilities to reduce
reliance on unionized workers, the employees who are hired
into new classifications, plants, or facilities may be doing exactly the same jobs as their unionized colleagues in older
classifications, plants, or facilities. The interests of these two
sets of employees are likely to be the same but for the artificial
changes made by the employer to avoid unionization of the
new workers. Therefore, accretion of these two groups would
appear to be appropriate.
An accretion finding in such a situation, however, may be
adversely affected by the employer's actions. For example, an
employer's shift to a new job classification, plant or facility
may have been paired with additional (intended, or merely
incidental) changes that could possibly manipulate a later
accretion finding. The employers' deunionization strategy
could place employees into a new classification or facility and
do so under different supervision, under different compensation terms, with no employee interchange, and a distance away
from the unionized unit. Such slight changes would impact
directly on key factors in the accretion analysis."
B. OrganizationalGerrymanderingand Analogizing
to the Alter Ego Doctrine
As shown above, an employer can manipulate its production
and management systems to avoid unionization and influence
the accretion factors in favor of management's interests. I refer
111. See, e.g., Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc. v. Industrial Union of Marine &

Shipbuilding Workers, 250 N.L.R.B. 661 (1980) (mentioning a finding that the employer "seized upon the establishment of its new plant at Owings Mills to rid itself of
the Union").
112. Such changes would have an impact on the following factors respectively:
common management and supervision, conditions of employment, employee interchange, and geographic proximity.
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to this process as organizational gerrymandering because the
employer, in essence, redistricts its production staff so as to
reduce the number of employees in a chosen bargaining unit.
To address the problems organizational gerrymandering can
create under accretion analysis, the analysis needs to be reformed to take employer motive into consideration. Under
such a reform, the present accretion factors would be
reweighted once an employer's union animus was established.
This reweighting of the factors would guard against an employer's ability to manipulate an accretion determination. To
explain this approach, it is useful to analogize to the NLRB's
treatment of a problem that yields similar results-that of
double-breasted employers.
"A unionized employer that creates an ostensibly separate
firm with a nonunionized work force is said to engage in the
practice of 'double-breasting."'1 13 The practice of doublebreasting poses a significant threat to organized workers, in
that it allows "an employer to shed bargaining and contractual
responsibilities" with respect to its unionized employees and
divert work to its separate non-union workforce."4 If this practice appears similar to the scenarios mentioned above
regarding employer motive, it is no wonder. The doublebreasted employer manipulates its workforce in the exact
same manner as in organizational gerrymandering, yet it goes
one step further by placing the non-union workforce in a superficially separate firm. 1 5 Despite the similarity, however,
these two employer actions can receive different treatment
under present law.""
Unlike the situation where the employer does not take the
additional step of establishing a separate non-union firm, in
the context of double-breasting the NLRB has addressed the
problem of an employer manipulating the legal analysis
when it manipulates its workforce into unionized and nonunionized groups." 7 This problem is addressed through the
alter ego doctrine, which restructures the traditional legal

113. Befort, supra note 38, at 67.
114. See id. at 69.
115. See id. at 73-74.
116. Double-breasting is addressed by application of either the single employer or
alter ego doctrine; however, accretion is applied where two groups of employees are
separated inside a commonly owned organization.
117. See Befort, supra note 38, at 71 (discussing the consideration of employer
manipulation as a policy behind the alter ego approach to double-breasted employers).
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analysis in double-breasting cases by considering the employer's intent to avoid labor obligations."'
The alter ego doctrine originated, and is most frequently
used, to address problems of successorship where an employer
purportedly discontinued its operations but now maintains a
disguised continuing operation under another name." 9 The
doctrine later came to be routinely applied to double-breasted
operations 120 along with the traditionally
applied doctrine
21
known as the single employer test.
The alter ego doctrine functions through "a seven factor test
requiring substantially identical management, business
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and
ownership between" the two firms. 2 2 "In practice, the alter ego
standard is a flexible test that focuses on three principal
issues-(1) ownership, (2) integrated operations and control,
and (3) motive."' 23 By contrast, the single employer test
consists of four factors: "1. Interrelation of operations; 2.
Centralized control of labor relations; 3. Common management;
and 4. Common ownership or common control.""2' The key
difference between the application of the single employer and
alter ego doctrines is the consideration of employer motive
under the alter ego analysis.'2 5

118. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
508 (5th Cir. 1982) ("However, the focus of the alter ego doctrine, unlike that of the
single employer doctrine, is on the existence of a disguised continuance or an attempt
to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement through a sham transaction or technical change in operations.").
119. See Befort, supra note 38, at 89-90.
120. See id. at 91-92; cf Earl R. Pfeffer & Lisa Imbrogno, Important Bargaining
Unit Issues and Election Misconduct Developments: A Review and Update, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1993, at
177 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 470, 1993) ("Whereas
early alter ego cases required that the union entity cease operations entirely, this
requirement no longer exists. As explained by the Eighth Circuit: 'To limit the doctrine's applicability to companies which have shut down entirely would allow antiunion employers a complete escape from alter ego liability, simply by keeping a small
aspect of the predecessor operation alive.'" (quoting Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National
Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir.1986))).
121. See Befort, supra note 38, at 92. Like the alter ego doctrine, the single employer doctrine is an import to the context of double-breasted employers. See id. at 70.
The single employer doctrine was previously used as a jurisdictional device to aggregate the many parts of an enterprise in order to establish the minimum dollar value
of business required for coverage under the NLRA. See id. at 75.
122. Id. at 93.
123. Id. at 94.
124. Id. at 75.
125. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
507-08 (5th Cir. 1982).
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This added consideration of employer motive under alter ego
analysis takes on a particular significance in light of the different effect an alter ego determination can yield. Once the
alter ego test has been satisfied, the Board will not then require a separate determination of unit appropriateness under
a community of interests test.126 The two groups will simply be
treated as one unless the court finds some aspect of the
merged unit repugnant to the NLRA."' By contrast, under the
single employer doctrine, where motive is not considered, a full
bargaining unit determination must follow any finding of single employer status.'2
Given the different treatment of these two doctrines, one
can safely surmise that the finding of an unlawful employer
motive somehow alleviates the need to study unit appropriateness at any depth. While the rationale for dismissing the
need for a traditional unit determination is not fully clear, it
seems to emanate from two separate policies. The first is a
general intolerance of employer discrimination. 2 9 The second
policy appears to be founded in the fear that without a separate consideration of motive, the employer could manipulate
the traditional components of the single employer inquiry and
thereby avoid any action or sanction from the NLRB.1 30 As
should be apparent, this is the exact same concern that was
voiced above when discussing the need to address organizational gerrymandering under the accretion doctrine. Insofar as
the same policies can be found to apply to accretion disputes,
this alter ego approach to employer motive needs to be imported to the accretion context.
The policy of discouraging employer discrimination is a key
concern under the NLRA,"" which contains language
effectuating that concern in section 8.32 The consideration of
antiunion discrimination comes into the alter ego doctrine
through its inquiry concerning the presence of an intent to

126. See Pfeffer & Imbrogno, supra note 120, at 177.
127. See id.; see also CarpentersLocal, 690 F.2d at 509.
128. See Carpenters Local, 690 F.2d at 505, 509; see also Joseph H. Bucci & Brian
P. Kirwin, Double Breasting in the Construction Industry, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Jan.
1990, at 29-30.
129. See Befort,,supra note 38, at 103 ("One of the core objectives of the NLRA is
to deter conduct designed to avoid labor obligations.").
130. See id. at 71 (commenting that the single employer formula "can easily be
manipulated through planned union avoidance techniques").
131. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
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avoid labor obligations. 33 That inquiry is based on the general
policy that "[tihe Board will not tolerate an employer's use of a
corporate fiction in order to avoid its obligations under the
Act."" This policy can be applied with equal force to
organizational gerrymandering in the accretion context. If the
employer establishes a separate job classification, plant, or
facility with the intent of avoiding labor obligations, the only
difference from the double-breasted employer is the lack of
establishment of an ostensibly separate firm. Neither the
effect on the employees in the two segregated groups nor the
employer's intent is any different. In light of these similar
effects, it seems anomalous to afford the two situations
different treatment.
The second concern underlying the employer motive inquiry
involves the possibility that of employers could manipulate the
outcome of a formula if employer motive were not considered.
It is partly for this reason that courts and the Board so
frequently use alter ego analysis to supplement the motiveneutral single employer test. Because the single employer test
ignores employer motive, that test is susceptible to manipulation by crafty employers. 13 As one commentator explains:
The Board's use of [the single employer] formula in the
double-breasted context, however, fails to recognize the
very real possibility for an employer to establish a doublebreasted operation for the purpose of avoiding existing labor obligations. By failing to address this potential, the
Board's single employer test provides employers with a
powerful temptation to manipulate that mechanistic formula to their own advantage. 3 '
A parallel exists between the motive neutral single employer test and the present accretion analysis-both are
equally subject to manipulation because neither addresses the
question of employer motive. Indeed one factor common to both
of these analyses, labor relations control, has been specifically
criticized as being too easily subjected to unchecked manipulation. "The incentive to manipulate is most apparent with
respect to the criterion of labor relations control.... [A] double

133.
134.
135.
136.

See Befort, supra note 38, at 95.
Pfeffer & Imbrogno, supra note 120, at 177.
See Befort, supra note 38, at 86.
Id.
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breasted employer may avoid a single employer determination
by establishing separate layers of supervision for the two
firms, despite the presence of a centrally conceived labor relations policy."187 In the accretion context, the same manipulation
could be achieved if the employer applied superficially different supervision to its new non-union job classifications, plants,
or facilities. With no consideration of employer motive to guard
against such manipulation, accretion analysis would become a
mere obstacle that an employer could maneuver around on its
way to avoiding union obligations. For this reason, as well as
for the general deterrence of employer discrimination, courts
should expand the present accretion formula to include an
employer motive element similar to that used in the alter ego
test.
C. Reforming Accretion to Add an "AlterEgo"
Motive Component
If consideration of employer motive is added to the accretion
doctrine, it should merely supplement and not supplant the
present accretion analysis. Just as under alter ego analysis,
"[an evasive intent... should not be construed as an absolute
prerequisite to the extension of the collective bargaining
agreement."138 Accordingly, the traditional multi-factor approach to accretion analysis 39 should remain a part of any
reformed analysis to safeguard the interests of employees and
their representatives in situations where employer intent to
manipulate is absent or cannot be proved. 40
Once it has been resolved that an employer motive factor
should be added to the present accretion analysis, questions of
form arise. For example, how should the employer motive factor fit into the accretion doctrine? There are numerous
possibilities: An employer motive factor could be added to the
present list of accretion factors; employer motive could also be

137. Id. at 86-87.
138. Id. at 103.
139 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
140. By treating the employer's evasive intent in a manner that is uniform with
the alter ego analysis, the proposed accretion reform would improve consistency under
the law and give practitioners better guidance as to what is required of them.
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added as a weighted factor;' an evasive motive finding could
trigger an automatic accretion similar to the treatment under
alter ego analysis;12 or an evasive motive finding could trigger
a modified accretion analysis that would control for potential
manipulation. Based on the need to balance the various policies involved, the last approach seems preferable. For ease of
reference, this approach will be referred to as the two-tiered
approach.
The proposed two-tiered approach controls for more adverse
effects than do the other options. The first two optionsadding employer motive to the list of factors and adding it as a
weighted factor-fall short because simply considering employer motive as a factor among others continues to neglect
the risk of employer manipulation of the other factors. However, the third option, ordering an automatic accretion once an
employer's evasive intent is established, goes too far in the opposite direction. Such an approach completely neglects the
need to consider unit appropriateness and, thus, subjugates
the interests protected by sections 7 and 9 to concerns for employer antiunion discrimination under section 8. The last of
the options, the two-tiered approach, offers the best solution.
The two-tiered approach considers both employer discrimination and manipulation while maintaining a concern for unit
appropriateness. It controls for employer discrimination by
taking employer motive into consideration as a threshold inquiry, and then, once an anti-union motive has been
established, it modifies the traditional accretion analysis in
order to control for manipulation. This approach addresses the
concern for unit appropriateness by keeping some form of the
traditional accretion analysis alive even after a finding of evasive intent has been established.
D. Application of the Two-Tiered Motive Approach
The proposed two-tiered motive inquiry must begin early in
the accretion process. Before even considering the standard
accretion factors, a court should determine whether the
141. Adding employer motive as a weighted factor is similar to the treatment
some courts afford interchange of employees and common control and management.
See Gitano Group, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1174 (1992).
142. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
509 (5th Cir. 1982); Pfeffer & Imbrogno, supra note 120, at 177.
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employer intended to establish two separate groups of
employees in order to avoid its union obligations. If the court
failed to find an evasive motive, it should apply the
overwhelming community of interests test that is standard in
accretion cases."' However, where the court found an evasive,
intent it should apply a modified version of the community of
interests test. Under this modified test, the court would
consider only those factors that the employer cannot easily
alter for the purpose of union avoidance. The factors that must
drop out of the analysis include: geographic proximity,
similarity of employment conditions, centralization of
administrative, managerial, and supervisory control, and
employee interchange. All of these factors can be manipulated
by an employer who wants to evade the process of
unionization.'" This modification would leave only the factors
that are less subject to manipulation: similarity of skills and
functions, functional integration of the employer, and employee
views. Although these three factors do not provide as complete
a unit appropriateness determination as would the full set of
factors, they are the only reliable indicators that can be
considered after a finding of evasive motive because the other
factors were possibly subjected to employer manipulation.
While limited in number, these remaining factors provide more
information than one might think.
Comparisons of common skills and functions among the two
groups of employees under consideration can show a great deal
about their similarity in other respects.' 5 For example, if the
two groups of employees make the same product, perform the
same task, or utilize exactly the same skills in performing
their jobs, it is likely that the two groups share common interests. In part these shared interests are due to the fact that the
two groups of employees represent the same type of labor inptts-the same skills being used for a similar function-and
143. This community of interests test should, of course, consider employee views
consistent with this Note's other proposal. See supra Part II.
144. Geographic proximity can be manipulated where the employer gets to choose
the location of its new plant or facilities. Similarity of employment conditions can be
manipulated by an employer and, as mentioned earlier in this Note, variances in employment terms and conditions are among the evils accretion analysis is meant to
prevent. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Centralization of management and

supervision is also subject to manipulation by the employer dedicated to avoiding
labor obligations. See Befort, supra note 38, at 86-87. Employee interchange can be
limited by an employer as well.
145. Cf Gitano Group, 308 N.L.R.B. at 1174 (discussing dissimilarities in the work

performed by two groups of employees that disfavored accretion).
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as such, the bargaining power of the one group can affect the
bargaining power of the other. Thus, the weaker bargaining
power of the target group of non-unionized employees may adversely affect the strength of the unionized group in its
demands for terms and conditions. This effect naturally occurs
because the employer always has the option of turning to the
functionally similar unorganized employees with its work when
the similarly skilled organized workers demand extra pay.
Functional integration of the employer can demonstrate
whether the two groups of employees work in the same process
for the employer, or perform discrete tasks that would reduce
the number of shared interests.14 6 While this factor is more
within the control of the employer, it is not as subject to manipulation because certain functions are necessarily required
in order to keep a business productive. Only so much manipulation can be done in this context without affecting the success
and effectiveness of the employer's underlying business.
Employee views are, of course, not within the direct control
of employers. Although employee views can be manipulated by
employer threats and discrimination, such employer action
would constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) of
the NLRA."7 Because there are already safeguards on such
manipulation, this factor can be maintained even after a positive motive showing. The relevance of employee views has been
explained above.1'
With the addition of the two-tiered motive inquiry, the
accretion analysis will be able to consider employer evasive
intent and still maintain its concerns for bargaining
exclusivity and unit appropriateness under sections 9(a) and
(b). Furthermore, this method should address problems of
employer manipulation of the accretion analysis, while giving
unions, employees, and the Board the ability to prevent
employer tactics geared at avoiding labor obligations.

146. See NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 475-76 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying
the functional integration factor).
147. See 29 US.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1994).
148. See supra notes 55-87 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Accretion analysis as presently formulated neglects to
account for two of the NLRAs key concerns-preventing
employer discrimination and fostering uncoerced employee
action and choice. 49 These omissions adversely affect the
accretion doctrine in that courts restrain their actions out of
deference to the unknown employee views, 5 ' and because no
thought is given to potential employer manipulation of the
legal analysis.'5 '
These shortcomings of the accretion doctrine can be
remedied by adding considerations of employee views and
employer motive to the present analysis. Employee views
should be considered along with the other accretion factors to
bring a discussion of section 7 concerns into the process.
Employer motive should also be considered because an
employer's separation of two groups of employees might be
motivated by an intent to avoid labor obligations. This
consideration of employer motive must be paired with a
restructuring of the accretion analysis where an evasive intent
is found. Such a restructuring will guard against calculated
employer manipulation of the factored analysis. By adding
these concerns, courts and the Board can add necessary policy
to the present accretion doctrine's borrowed analysis.

149.
150.

See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

151. See supra notes 112, 130 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Accretion Survey Results
The survey referenced in this Appendix was sent to senior
labor partners in 89 different management and union side law
firms. Only 22 firms responded (11 for each side). Different
survey instruments were used for management and union law
firms and those surveys were, for the most part, similar in all
but technical respects. The one significant difference in the
surveys is the inclusion of a question on organizational gerrymandering in the union survey instrument. Examples of the
survey instruments used are included in this Appendix.
The purpose of this survey was to gather an indication of
views among labor law practitioners as they related to the
topic of this Note. The sample size is small and the results
should not be relied upon for anything more than proof that
some labor law practitioners share the respondents' beliefs on
the questions posed. The point of these results is to demonstrate that some support exists for certain general statements
made in the text and footnotes of this Note. The degree of this
support, however, cannot be derived from this small sample.
Only the survey questions relied upon in this Note have their
results tabulated below.
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FIRMS INDICATING THAT THEY HAVE EITHER
CONTEMPLATED OR SETTLED AN ACCRETION CASE
FOR AN ELECTION
Combined
Yes

Labor

Management
Yes

No

Other

Yes

No

Other

5

6

0

1

4

0

Combined %
Yes

55%

12

FIRMS INDICATING THAT ACCRETION FACTORS AT
PRESENT ARE CLEAR OR PROVIDING OF
ADEQUATE GUIDANCE
Combined
.Yes

Labor

Management
Yes

No

Other

Yes

No

Other

3

5

3

9

1

1

12

Combined %
Yes

55%

FIRMS INDICATING THAT THEY FEEL IT ODD THAT EMPLOYEE
INTEREST IS NOT FREQUENTLY CONSIDERED AS A FORMAL
ACCRETION FACTOR
Labor

Management
Yes

No

5

6

Other Yes No
0

4

7

Combined
Yes

Combined
% Yes

Management
% Yes

9

41%

45%

Other
0

UNION FIRMS BELIEVING THAT ACCRETION ANALYSIS SHOULD
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL
GERRYMANDERING
Yes

No

Other

Percentage
Yes

Percentage
No

10

0

1

91%

0%
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HOW FIRMS FEEL ABOUT THE
PREDICTABILITY OF CASE
OUTCOMES UNDER ACCRETION CASELAW
MANAGEMENT
Predictable

Somewhat
Predictable

Somewhat
Inconsistent

Random
or Worse

0

6

4

1

Percent Predictable

Percent Inconsistent

55%

45%
Combined Predictable
41%
LABOR

Predictable

Somewhat
Predictable

Somewhat
Inconsistent

Random
or Worse

7

1

03
Percent Predictable

Percent Inconsistent

27%

73%
Combined Inconsistent
59%
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Accretion Survey
(Union)
1. How frequently does your firm/department see a potential
accretion case?
(a) very frequently (every 3 months)
(b) somewhat frequently (every 6 months)
(c) routinely (every 6 to 18 months)
(d) infrequently (18 months to 36 months)
(e) rarely (takes years to see one)
2. How many accretion cases has your firm/department
taken all the way through to an NLRB determination in the
last 5 years?
3. How many accretion claims has your firm/department
settled or abandoned in the last five years?
4. Has your firm/department ever contemplated, or has a
management attorney ever offered to settle an accretion case
for an election?
5. Do you find the accretion factors at present to be clear or
providing of adequate guidance?
(General factors: geographic proximity of two groups, common
day-to-day supervision, collective bargaining history, similarity
of employment terms & conditions, interchange of employees,
common facilities, similarity of skills and functions, administrative integration, and functional integration)
6. Which factor(s) do you find to be the most useless?
7. Which factor(s) do you find to be the most purposive?
8. Do you find it odd that employee interest is only infrequently considered as a formal accretion factor given that
Section 7 rights are one basis of the accretion remedy?
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9. Generally, when viewing a new accretion case, do you find
the potential result under accretion caselaw to be:
(a) predictable
(b) predictable enough to give clients a picture of a
probable outcome
(c) somewhat inconsistent
(d) random
(e) a small step away from a hocus-pocus ritual
10. Do you find the present distinction between spin off
claims and accretion claims to be useful (not only the basic
conceptual distinction, but also that under spin off the employer has the burden, while under accretion the union has the
burden)?
11. Do you believe that accretion/spin off analysis should
pay more attention to the problem of "organizational gerrymandering" by employers (i.e. shifting around their facilities
and workforce to avoid unionized employees)?
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Accretion Survey
(Management)
1. How frequently do accretion cases arise among your client
base?
(a) very frequently (every 3 months)
(b) somewhat frequently (every 6 months)
(c) routinely (every 6 to 18 months)
(d) infrequently (18 months to 36 months)
(e) rarely (takes years to see one)
2. How many accretion cases has your firm/department
taken all the way through to an NLRB determination in the
last 5 years?
3. How many accretion claims has your firm/department
settled or has the union abandoned in the last five years?
4. Has your firm/department ever contemplated, or has the
union ever offered to settle an accretion case for an election?
5. Do you find the accretion factors at present to be clear or
providing of adequate guidance?
(General factors: geographic proximity of two groups, common
day-to-day supervision, collective bargaining history, similarity
of employment terms & conditions, interchange of employees,
common facilities, similarity of skills and functions, administrative integration, and functional integration)
6. Which factor(s) do you find to be the most useless?
7. Which factor(s) do you find to be the most purposive?
8. Do you find it odd that employee interest is only infrequently considered as a formal accretion factor given that
Section 7 rights are one basis of the accretion remedy?
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9. Generally, when viewing a new accretion case, do you find
the potential result under accretion caselaw to be:
(a) predictable
(b) predictable enough to give clients a picture of a
probable outcome
(c) somewhat inconsistent
(d) random
(e) a small step away from a hocus-pocus ritual
10. Do you find the present distinction between spin off
claims and accretion claims to be useful (not only the basic
conceptual distinction, but also that under spin off the employer has the burden, while under accretion the union has the
burden)?

